Phenomenological Psychology Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Phenomenological Psychology - Essay ExampleAs a result f this bracketing f the lifelikeistic positing f reality and the epoche f the beliefs that correspond to this positing, the how f the givenness f such outer and inner objects is to be phenomenologically investigated qua their status as the meanings (Sinne) f that which is, meanings that are now given to pure consciousness.For Husserl, Sinn designates that which is manifest to phenomenological reflection, subsequent to the bracketing f the reality f both inner and outer objects (and eventually the perspective f the natural world) and the epoche f the natural attitudes naive belief in the intuitive reality f these objects and world-horizon. As such, Sinn articulates the status f the phenomenologically rock-bottom phenomena f these objects and world-horizon and the corresponding natural attitude which is manifested when the phenomenological attitude no longer goes along with the natural positing f these objects and world-horizon in terms f the taken-for-granted status f their transcendent reality. ... In the case f meaning, there is the suggestion f conceptuality, which brings along with it jerry-built connotations f mental and/ or abstract reality. In the case f sense, there is the suggestion f sense perception, which also carries with it sensible and/or physical connotations. Since the phenomena referred to by Sinn may include the phenomenologically reduced manifestation f both concepts and sense perception without, however, necessarily being exhausted by either, I go away sometimes leave the word untranslated, as a reminder that the scope f its reference may exceed these possibilities. (The reference f Sinn to the phenomena f the nonobjectifiable horizon f the natural world and the attitude that posits its reality, for instance, is one such case f the terms scope exceeding both conceptual and physical phenomena.) The naturalistically posited external and interior objects are therefore not to be inve stigated in terms f their naturalistically posited statuses as realities transcendent to consciousness rather, they are uncovered, in accord with their phenomenologically psychological reduced status as meanings manifest to consciousness purified f such positing (and belief in this positing) f transcendent reality, in terms f the immanent thing matter f the science f phenomenological psychology. And it is precisely the lived-experience f such meaning and its structure that articulates the positive account f the subject matter f psychology provided by Husserls phenomenological psychology. Insofar as both psychological and transcendental phenomenology are defined in terms f the reflective securing and eidetic inflorescence f pure consciousness, their demarcation must be sought, then, not